This article explores the reception of Emile Durkheim in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. In recent years, the classical assumption according to which sociology is neatly organised in distinct national traditions has been challenged. This article further contributes to this challenge by analysing the case of two prominent German-speaking legal scholars, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. Despite major differences in their political and scientific outlook, both argued against the encroachments of the social sciences into the field of legal studies. This article shows how Kelsen mounted a polemic against Durkheim, on the basis of a first-hand knowledge of his writings. Kelsen believed that Durkheim committed several errors. In particular, he interpreted Durkheim’s famous sentence according to which social facts must be treated as things’ as a clear sign of a materialistic, deterministic and positivistic attitude which neglects the power of ideas and norms. Schmitt targeted sociology by way of a criticism not of Durkheim but of Léon Duguit, who had been inspired by Durkheim and pleaded for a collaboration between legal scholars and social scientists. According to Schmitt, a sociological approach to law amounts to a dangerous denial of the centrality of the state in politics.

This paper analyzes a dual relationship between Adorno and Durkheim: on the one hand, Adorno adopts Durkheim’s perspective on society, describing it as an obscure, opaque thing that individuals cannot understand by themselves; on the other, he tries to get out of the opacity that he recognizes as a structural moment of the society he lives in. This last point engages us in a discussion of the relationship between political sociology and philosophy of emancipation, which allows to study in a new perspective the only text Adorno published in his lifetime on Durkheim: his preface to Philosophy and Sociology, the critical violence of which is well known and often interpreted as a complete rejection of Durkheim’s sociology. The thesis of this article is that the conflict between Adorno and Durkheim is a political one and that the division between the two authors lies in their evaluation of the capacity of the modern capitalist society to produce out of itself common ideals that assure the justice of the actual social order.

The article reconstructs the double movement of departure and return to Emile Durkheim’s sociology that Jürgen Habermas realized in his work in order to define the theoretical paradigm of communicative action and revive the original project of Critical Theory. It highlights, in the first part, how Habermas first used Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life to assign a phylogenetic function to ritual practices and explain modernity, from an evolutionist perspective, as the final result of a progressive linguistification of the sacred, having substituted the communion of minds in rites with the communication of reasons in the public sphere. After having discussed the two main objections that Habermas addressed to Durkheim at the time of The Theory of Communicative Action, the second part shows how he recently revised his rationalist framework through a new anthropological reading of The Elementary Forms, aimed at demonstrating, in the context of a more complex account of evolution, why the requirement of justice discloses, even in modernity, the active presence of the sacred in language and orientates the critical work of reason in the search of solidarity. Pointing out the new directions in which the hypothesis of a linguistification of the sacred must be seriously revised, it ends by suggesting how the question of social justice may open the path to a positive cooperation between sociology and Critical Theory.

In his introduction to the first German translation of Durkheim’s Division of Labour in Society, Luhmann hails the work as a “classic” of sociology, stressing its continued relevance and the need to persist in thinking with Durkheim. The present study focuses on this interpretative gesture, that is, on how Luhmann read Durkheim and set out a research program for sociology by defining its field of investigation, paying particular attention to his discussion of Durkheim’s approach to modern individuality. According to this interpretation, the French sociologist worked out a “sociological” conceptualization of the individual. On the one hand, in Luhmann’s view, Durkheim’s theory sheds light on a decrease in social control. On the other hand, he stresses that this inquiry into individuality was closely connected with a critical investigation of another conception of the individual that seems to derive from it, namely, the idea of human beings as “self-constituting.” Nevertheless, a complete examination of Luhmann’s interpretative gesture must also consider what is overlooked, namely the political conception of the individual Durkheim aimed to develop. In an attempt to fill this gap, this article highlights the political effects that such an occultation may entail.

Entretiens

Interview by Gregor Fitzi and Nicola Marcucci with Hans Joas on the reception of Émile Durkheim in Germany.
Berlin: Humboldt University of Berlin, 6 October 2014